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him a party. Plaintiff having those rights, the master cannot 
be prejudiced by their exercise except in the situation where 
there might be inconsistent judgments; that is, a judgment 
against the master but in favor of the servant where the issue 
is one that necessarily affects the master's vicarious liability. 
In the instant case if there had been no dismissal of the action 
against the servant the retrial of the action against him might 
have resulted in a judgment favorable to him and hence in-
(;onsistent with the judgment against the master, but that will 
not happen because the action against the servant will not be 
retried. It is dismissed. How can it be said that the master 
is entitled to the benefit of the new trial granted as to the 
servant when because of the dismissal there will be no retrial 
as to the servant 1 Indeed it is immaterial whether the order 
for a new trial was based upon some ground affecting the 
master's liability. The effect of the dismissal is to wipe the 
cause of action' against the servant from the record. The 
proceeding is back in the same condition it would have been 
if plaintiff had sued the master alone. 
But if we assume that the master is entitled to the benefit 
of the order granting a new trial as to the servant, certainly 
it must first be determined that that order was based upon a 
ground which affects both the master and servant. The order 
was made on all of the grounds provided by statute except 
insufficiency of the evidence. The precise ground does not 
appear. If it is supportable on any ground it must be 
assumed that the court granted the servant's motion on some 
ground that did not affect the master's liability. Otherwise 
the denial of the master's motion for a new trial would be 
error. A trial court is not presumed to act erroneously. Ou 
the contrary all presumptions are in favor of the correctness 
of its action. Hence, if there is any error for which the ser-
vant's motion for a new trial could be granted without affect-
ing the master, that ground must be presumed to be the one 
relied upon. I suggest two such grounds. There may be 
more. There may have been misconduct on the part of plain-
tiff's counsel such as suggesting that the servant was insured 
or was a wealthy man well able to pay any verdict rendered 
against him. Neither of those statements would prejudice 
the master or be error as to him. Yet they would entitle the 
servant to a new trial. The record does not show that such 
misconduct occurred but neither does it show it did not occur, 
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It does not contain the arguments to the juri: We should 
presume that the trial court acted correctly and therefore 
that such error existed in the absence of anything in the rec. 
ord to the contrary. 
Furthermore, the majority opinion, by the process of elimi-
nation, determines that the motion for a new trial as to the' 
servant must have been granted upon the ground of excessive 
damages. If such was the case, then a new trial should be 
ordered on the issue of damages only instead of requiring 
the plaintiff to establish again all of the other issues in the 
case. 
In my opinion the judgment should be affirmed. 
[So F. No. 16840. In Bank. Aug. 18, 1944.] 
MATSON TERMINALS, INC. (a Corporation) et at, Peti-
tioners, V. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMIS-
SION et al., Respondents; FRANK ABELLEIRA et at, 
Interveners and Respondents. 
[1] Unemployment Relief-Remedies of Employer-Mandamus.-
Unemployment Insurance Act, § 41.1 (Stats. 1941, p. 2535; 
Deering's Gen. Laws, 1941 Supp., Act 8780d), which simply 
makes it unnecessary to file a protest as a condition to con-
testing items charged to the employer's account and suing 
for the recovery of allegedly excessive contributions, and 
which provides for supplying him information on which to 
base his contest, cannot operate, any more than the provision 
for court review in § 45.10, to deprive the court of power to 
review a decision of the Employment Commission awarding 
unemployment benefits alleged to be in violation of the act. 
[2] Id. - Remedies of Employer - Administrative and Judicial 
Remedies. - Although Unemployment Insurance Act, § 41.1, 
provides for an administrative determination of the correct-
ness of the charges affecting an employer's merit rating and 
for recovery of overpayments, this remedy, likE' that afforded 
by § 45.10, is distinct from that provided by § 67 to test the 
propriety of the payment of benefits. An employer whose re-
[1] See 11 Cal.Jur. Ten-year SuPp. (Pocket Part), "Unemploy-
ment Reserves and Social Security." 
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serve account may be affected by such payment to any indi-
vidual formerly in his employ is a party "beneficially inter-
ested" in the administrative proceeding to determine the award 
of benefits, and retains this status for the purpose of testing 
before a court of law the legality of the Employment Com-
mission's final decision. 
[3] Id.-Remedies of Employer-Judicial Remedies-Finality of 
Determination.-Uliemployment Insurance Act, § 41.1 was not 
intended to afford the employer an opportunity .to relitigate 
the propriety of an award of benefits. Since he may raise 
objections to the award in proceedings under §§ 67 and 72, 
the decision in such proceedings will finally determine the 
propriety of the payments, thus precluding objections by him 
to charges based on the claimants' ineligibility for benefits 
in later proceedings to which they are not parties. 
[4] ld.-Disqualification-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dis-
pute.-Under Employment Insurance Act, § 56(a), providing 
that an individual is not eligible for unemployment benefits 
if he leaves his work because of a trade dispute, longshore-
men who voluntarily refused to cross the picket lines estab-
lished at their employers' waterfront docks by striking ship 
clerks were not entitled to benefits. 
[5a, 5b] ld.-Disqualification-Leaving Work Because of Trade 
Dispute.-In enacting Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a), 
providing that a claimant is ineligible for benefits while "he 
continues out of work by reason of the fact that the trade 
dispute is still in active progress in the establishment in which 
he was employed," the Legislature did not intend that the 
disqualification should turn on whether the claimant had en-
tered a legal relationship of employer and employee at the 
precise moment that the trade dispute arose, as there is no 
generally accepted test for determining at a particular moment 
whether a person is "employed," and as the act establishes 
a policy of neutrality by provisions that payment or with-
holding of benefits should not be used to aid either party to 
a labor dispute. 
[6] ld.-Disqualification-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dis-
puto.-Where a registered longshoreman does not work reg-
ularly for the same employer at the same place of business, 
but under a contract between his union and an employers' 
association works under an arrangement that assures him his 
proportionate share of the work on a waterfront, and where 
ho, in his turn, ia dispatched to the various dooks at whioh 
his services fl.re required, the longshore work that he regu-
larly performs for the various members of the employers' 
Aug. 1944] MATSON TERMINALS, INC. '11. CAL. EMP. COM. 697 




association, and to which he has an exclusive right, is ''his 
work" within Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a). 
ld.-Disqualification-Leaving Work Because of Trade Dis-
pute.-The word "establishment" in Unemployment Insurance 
Act, § 56(a), as applied with reference to registered long-
shoremen who under a contract are assigned through a hiring 
hall to all the work of all the employers of an employers' 
association, means the various waterfront dock;s covered by 
the contract and at which longshoremen customarily work; 
and where this is the area covered by a ship clerks' strike, 
longshoremen who refuse to cross the strikers' picket lines 
are not eligible for unemployment benefits. 
ld.-Conclusiveness of Referee's A:fII.rmance of· Allowance of 
Benefits.-Employees who left the4' work because of a trade 
dispute are not entitled to payments of unemployment benefits 
on affirmance of an allowance of such benefits to them by a 
referee pursuant to Unemployment Insurance Act, § 67, re-
gardless of whether the award was right or wrong, where the 
Employment Commission vacated the referee's decision and 
transferred the matter to itself for determination, and where 
the Supreme Court has decided finally that the employees 
are not entitled to the payments. . 
ld.-Conclusiveness of Referee's Affirmance of. Allowance of 
Benefits.-Unemployment Insurance Act, § 67, providing that 
if a referee affirms an initial allowance of benefits they shall 
be paid regardless of any appeal that thereafter may be 
taken, merely prevents a stay of payments; it does not create 
a substantive right. If by a decision of the Employment Com-
mission on appeal or by a court on review the· payments are 
found to be unauthorized and illegal, said seetion does not 
make them valid. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the California 
Employment Commission to vacate an order awarding unem-
ployment benefits. Writ granted. 
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, Gregory A. Harrison, M. B. 
Plant and Richard Ernst for Petitioners. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Robert W. Kenny, Attor-
ney General, John J. Dailey,Deputy Attorney General, Mau-
rice P. McCaffrey, Ralph R. Planteen, Charles P. Soully, For-
rest M. Hill, Leonard M. Friedman, Gladstein, Grossman, 
Margolis & Sawyer, Ben Margolis, William Murrish, Glad-
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stein, Grossman, Sawyer & Edises, Aubrey Grossman and 
Richard Gladstein for Respondents. 
TRA YNOR, J.-The petitioners, a number of steamship 
and stevedoring companies that are employers within the 
meaning of the California Unemployment Insurance Act 
(Stats. 1935, ch. 352, .as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 
8780d), seek a writ of mandamus to prevent enforcement 
of an order of the California Employment Commission award-
ing unemployment insurance benefits to a group of long-
shoremen, interveners herein. 
The petitioners operate pier and terminal facilities in 
the San Francisco Bay area and are associated together in 
an incorporated, nonprofit, association, the Waterfront Em-
ployers' Association of San Francisco, which acts as inter-
mediary between them and their employees, represents them 
in collective bargaining and in the operation and maintenance 
of a hiring hall, compiles statistical information, and serves as 
a central clearing office of records of hours and wages of the 
longshoremen. It is also the agent of the employers in com-
puting the contributions and making the reports required by 
the Unemployment Insurance Act. The association does not 
handle cargoes or operate ships or terminal facilities, or oth-
erwise engage in the business of shipping or stevedoring. 
The companies constituting its membership are separate busi-
nesses, each with its own organization and personnel. The 
association does not include certain private companies oper-
ating pier and terminal facilities, the United States Army 
Transport Service, which owns and operates its Own pier 
facilities on a military reservation, or the Port of Oakland, 
which owns and operates docks at Oakland. The longshore-
men who are claimants in the present proceeding work inter-
mittently at various places for various employers. 
The method of hiring longshoremen prescribed by the MI-
lective bargaining agreement between the association and 
Local 1-10 of the International Longshoremen's and Ware-
housemen's Union, District No.1, was adopted after their 
strike in 1934, with the object of improving the distribution 
of employment. It seeks to make work opportunities avail-
able to all longshoremen equally by dispatching them in rota-
tion to jobs. Instead of reporting to the docks operated by 
each company, they report to a hiring hall jointly maintained 
and operated by the employers' association and the long-
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shoremen's union through a Labor Relations Committee com-
posed of three employer and three union representatives. 
Employers place their requests with the dispatcher at the 
hiring hall, who is selected by the union but is an employee 
of the Joint Labor Relations Committee. In dispatching men 
for work, preference is given to registered longshoremen, and 
no one else may be employed while anyone on the list of reg-
istered longshoremen is qualified, ready, and willing to work. 
rfhe Labor Relations Committee alone has the power to add 
names to the list or remove them. It may also issue permits 
allowing their holders to work if no registered longshoremen 
are available, and some of the claimants herein are such "per-
mit men." When men dispatched from the hiring hall report 
at a particular dock and are there dismissed without work, 
the company operating the dock must pay them two hours' 
"stand-by" compensation. At present the employers' asso-
ciation maintains a central office to which each employer for-
wards his payments and where the worker receives all the 
checks due him, but this proceeding relates to a time when the 
men received their checks by calling at the offices of the vari. 
ous companies for which they had worked during the week. 
The employers who are petitioners herein employ dock 
checkers, who. keep records of the cargo loaded or discharged 
lor the employers, and who belong to the Ship Clerks' Union, 
a local union affiliated with the same international as the 
longshoremen's union. For the purpose of bargaining col-
lectively with the Ship Clerks' Union, the employers belonged 
to the Dock Checkers Employers' Association of San Fran-
cisco. As a result of a dispute between the two, the Ship 
Clerks' Union called a strike on November 10, 1939, effective 
at 6 :00 p. m., against employers who were members of the 
Dock Checkers Employers' Association. The strike continued 
until January 3, 1940. Members of the longshoremen's union 
did not work for these employers during this period but filed 
claims with the California Employment Commission for un-
employment insurance benefits relating to this period. 
When the strike began, some claimants were working upon 
unfinished jobs for employers against whom the strike was 
declared; others were at the hiring hall awaiting their next 
assignment; others who were working for employers not in-
volved in the dispute did not stop work until their job assign-
ments were completed. 
The adjustment unit of the commission allowed benefits 
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to all the claimants, and the referee who heard the matter 
upon the employers' appeal affirmed this determination. The 
employers then sought a writ of mandamus from the Dis-
. trict Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, to prevent 
the commission from paying benefits to claimants. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ and ordered 
the commission not to pay the benefits pending determina· 
tion of the matter on the merits. This court, however, issued 
a peremptory writ of prohibition restraining the District 
Court of Appeal from enforcing the writ of mandate or the 
restraining order against the commission. (Abelleira v. Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280 [109 P.2d 942, 132 
A.L.R. 715].) Meanwhile, the commission ordered the ref-
eree's decision set aside and set the matter, then pending be-
fore it on appeal, for hearing. Furthermore, pending a deter-
mination on the merits, it refused to allow payment of the 
accrued benefits to claimants. Claimants' petition to this 
court for a writ of mandamus to compel payment of these 
benefits was denied. (Abellcira v. California Employment 
Commission, S. F. No. 16585.) Subsequently the commission, 
with two members absent and one dissenting, allowed benefits 
to all claimants except those who were working on cargoes 
when the strike was declared and were under instructions to 
return for work on those cargoes on the following day, and 
who refused to cross the ship clerks' picket lines. Even in 
these cases benefits were allowed if the employer's agent did 
not instruct the men to work or the foreman told them they 
might as well return to the hiring hall. By stipUlation the 
case was submitted on the record of the proceedings before 
the commission with the reservation of the right to try the 
question before the court whether the parties should have the 
right to try the case de novo, but the question as to this right 
was not argued. 
[1] The commission and the claimants contend that the 
employers have not exhausted their administrative remedies 
and are therefore not entitled to the writ. They assert that 
section 41.1 of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Stats. 1941, 
p. 2535; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1941 Supp., Act 8780d, § 41.1), 
added in 1941 after the decision of this court in Bodinson 
Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [109 
P.2d 935], supplies the remedy that the court there found 
lacking and provides the employer with a new administrative 
and legal remedy that adequately protects his rights. Section 
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41.1 requires the COmmISSIOn to furnish the employer with 
annual itemized statements showing the charges and credits 
to his account, the net balance of his reserve, and his contri-
bution rate for the next succeeding rating period. It provides 
that he may within a certain period protest any item shown 
therein, and, . if the proceeding is determined against him, 
bring an action against the commission to recover the amount 
of contribution claimed as an overpayment after such deter-
mination, although no protest was :filed at the time of pay-
ment. Section 41.1, however, does not provide a remedy for 
the illegal payment of benefits nor does the relief it affords 
differ substantially from that provided by section 45.10 of the 
act. The latter section provides for the payment of contri-
butions under protest and allows the employer to bring an 
action against the commission to recover contributions so 
paid. Section 41.1 simply makes it unnecessary to file a pro-
test as a condition to contesting items charged to the employ-
er's account and suing for the recovery of allegedly exces-
sive contributions, and provides for supplying him informa-
tion upon which to base his contest. It, therefore, can no 
more operate to deprive the court of power to review a deci-
sion of the commission awarding unemployment benefits 
alleged to be in violation of the plain provisions of the act 
than can the provision for court review in section 45.10. 
(See Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Com., 
supra.) 
[2] The eommission and claimants contend, however, that 
the employer's only interest is in his merit rating, and that 
section 41.1 affords an adequate remedy to contest char~es 
to his account affecting that rating. Although section 41.1 
provides for an administrative determination of the correct-
ness of the charges and for recovery of overpayments, this 
remedy, like that afforded by section 45.10, is distinct from 
that provided by section 67 of the act to test the propriety of 
the payment of benefits. Section 67 provides for the deter-
mination of the claimant's application for benefits and" any 
employer whose reserve account may be affected by the pay-
ment of benefits to any individual formerly in his employ may 
become an interested party to any proceeding under this 
article. . . ." As a party to the proceedillg he may appeal 
from the initial determination (Deering'S Gen. Laws, 1939 
Supp., Act 8780d, § 67) or from the decision of the refereo 
702 MATSON TERMINALS, INC. V. CAL. EMP. COM. [24 C.2d 
(Deering's Gen. Laws, 1939 Supp., Act 8780d, § 72). The act 
thus recognizes his adversary interest in preventing the illegal 
payment of benefits and does not limit his remedy to a pro-
test of charges that have been made to his account after the 
disputed benefits have been paid. He is a party" beneficially 
interested" in the administrative proceeding to determine the 
award of benefits and retains this status for the purpose of 
testing before a court of law the legality of the commission's 
final decision. (Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment 
Com., supra, at pp. 330-331.) 
[3] There is nothing in the statute to indicate that section 
41.1 was intended to afford the employer an opportunity to 
relitigate the propriety of the award of benefits. Since he 
may raise objections to the award in proceedings under sec-
tions 67 and 72, the decision in such proceedings will finally 
determine the propriety of the payments, thus precluding ob-
jections by him to charges based upon the claimants' ineligi-
bility for benefits in later proceedings to which they are not 
parties. The commission so interpreted its rule 41.1, which 
was in effect before the adoption of section 41.1 and which 
was phrased in substantially the same terms. (See Commis-
sion's Interpretative Bulletin, Commission form DE 1759.) 
[4] Petitioners contend that the claimants are not entitled 
to benefits on the ground that under section 56 ea) of the act 
a claimant. is ineligible to receive them if he left his work be-
cause of a trade dispute, for the period during which he "con-
tinues out of work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute 
is still in active progress in the establishment in which he 
was employed." They contend that claimants' work was the 
longshore work at the San Prancisco waterfront docks and 
that under the rule of Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Em-
ployment Com., 17 Ca1.2d 321 [109 P.2d 935], they left their 
work because of a trade dispute when they refused to per-
form it during the employers' dispute with the Ship Clerks' 
Union. 
In the Bodinson case the claimants were employed by the 
Bodinson Manufacturing Company as machinists. On May 
24, 1930, a strike was called by employees of the company 
who were members of the Welders' Union, Local No. 130. The 
. claimants refused to pass through the picket line established 
by the welders at the employer's plant and contended that 
they were entitled to benefit payments on the ground that 
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by the picket lines from going to work. The court rejected 
this contention: "If the picket line was maintained within 
the limits permitted by law, as this one presumably was, no 
physical compulsion was exerted to prevent co-respondents 
from working. They were unemployed solely because, in ac-
cordance with their union principles, they did not choose to 
work in a plant where certain of their fellow employees were 
on strike. Their own consciences and faith in their union 
principles dictated their action. This choice is one which 
members of organized labor are frequently called upon to 
make, and in the eyes of the law this kind of choice has never 
been deemed involuntary. . . . In brief, disqualification 
under the act depends upon the fact of voluntary action, and 
not the motives which led to it. The Legislature did not seek 
to interfere with union principles or practices. The act merely 
sets up certain conditions as a prerequisite to the right to re-
ceive compensation, and declares that in certain situations . 
the worker shall be ineligible to receive compensation. Fairly 
interpreted, it was intended to disqualify those workers who 
voluntarily leave their work because of a trade dispute. Co-
respondents in this proceeding in fact 'left their work because 
ofa trade dispute' and are consequently ineligible to receive 
benefit payments. " . 
The claimants in the present case refused to work for· the 
same reason that the claimants in the Bodinson case refused 
to work. They could have continued working at the same 
docks, for the same employers, under the same dispatching 
arrangement through the hiring hall as they had before the 
ship clerks' strike, and would have done so but for that strike 
and their unwillingness to cross the ship clerks' picket lines. 
They worked as they had in the past until the clerks' strike 
began and from then until the end of the strike refused to 
do any work affected by the strike. When the strike was over 
they returned to their work in the only way they could, by 
reporting to the hiring hall, each accepting his share of the 
work as it was assigned. The failure of the claimants, includ-
ing those who were engaged on a work assignment at the time 
the clerks' strike began, or who were working at that time at 
docks unaffected by the strike, to work during the period for 
which benefits are claimed was attributable solely to the 
trade dispute between their employers and the Ship Clerks' 
Union. Each of the many longshoremen who testified asserted 
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picket lines, and at the beginning of the strike responsible 
union officials announced on behalf of the longshoremen their 
refusal to work. It is immaterial, therefore, that some of the 
iongshoremen were not instructed to work or were told to 
return to the hiring hall. Their work was available to them 
during the dispute as it was in the past, but pursuant to their 
union principles they voluntarily refused it. They therefore 
left their work within the meaning of the act because of a 
trade dispute. This case accordingly falls within the rule of 
the Bodinson case. 
[5a] The commission and claimants contend that the Bod-
inson case is not controlling on the ground that when the 
welders in that case went on strike and the claimants refused 
to work,the relationship of employer and employee existed 
between the claimants and the Bodinson Manufacturing Com-
pany, whereas in the present case, except for those longshore-
men engaged upon a work assignment at the time the clerks' 
strike was called, there was no relationship of employer and 
employee between the claimants and any particular employer. 
The commission's holding that such a relationship must exist 
and that it did not exist in this case is based upon its inter-
pretation of the provisions of section 56(a) determining the 
duration of the disqualification. The section provides that a 
claimant is ineligible for benefits while "he continues out of 
work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute is still in 
active progress in the establishment in which he was em-
ployed" and thus contemplates that the "work" that claim-
ant left was in an "establishment in which he was employed." 
The commission contends that the word" employed" envisages 
the "legal relationship of employer and employee" between 
the claimant and a particular employer at the precise moment 
that the trade dispute arises, and that a longshoreman in the 
interim between work assignments is not "employed" for 
the reason that he is under no contract of hire, but simply 
has a right to be dispatched to a uew assignment in his proper 
rotational order and, therefore, does not stand in the legal 
relationship of employer and employee with any particular 
employer. Under the commission's interpretation of section 
56(a) the waterfront docks do not constitute an "establish-
ment" since they were separately owned and controlled by 
the various companies and were operated as separate enter-
prises. 
Had the Legislature intended, however, that disqualifica-
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tion under section 56(a) should turn on whether the claimant 
had ended a legal relationship of employer and employee at 
the precise moment the trade dispute arose, it would hardly 
have failed to speak in terms of that relationship or to provide 
some standard by which its existence at that time could be 
determined. It is unlikely that the Legislature would leave it 
to the commission, a body of laymen, to deduce such an inten-
tion from the words "left his work" by way of a presumed 
definition of the word "employed." Since there is no gen-
erally accepted test for determining at a particular moment 
whether a person is "employed" it cannot be presumed that 
the Legislature intended such a test when it used that word 
in section 56(a). The test for such a determination may vary 
according to the nature of the rights and liabilities involved. 
Thus a person might be regarded as employed at a given 
time when the question concerned the privileges and liabilities 
arising from concerted action by employees (See Restatement: 
Torts: § 775, et seq.) but would not be regarded as employed 
if the question concerned the liability of the employer to 
third persons (See Restatement: Agency: §§ 220, et seq.) 
or the liability of the employer to the employee. (See the 
Workmen's Compensation Act,· Lab. Code, §§ 3201-6002.) 
The Labor Code provides that a worker's employment is 
terminated by expiration of its appointed term (§ 2920), and 
that he "is presumed to have been hired for such length of 
time as the parties adopted for the estimation of wages" so 
that a "hiring at a yearly rate is presumed to be for one year; 
a hiring at a daily rate, for one day." (§ 3001; see White v. 
Oity of Alameda, 124 Cal. 95 [56 P. 795].) If the existence of 
the "legal relation of employer and employee" were deter-
mined by these sections, workers who are employed on an 
hourly or daily basis would be disqualified by a strike only if 
they dropped their tools in the midst of work and walked off 
the job. Under such a test the claimants in the Bodinson 
case would have been entitled to benefit payments. 
[6] The claimants agree that the foregoing provisions of 
the Labor Code are not controlling and that a man may leave 
his work within the meaning of the act "when he is not 
actually engaged in work at the time that the trade dispute 
starts." They contend, however, that registered longshore-
men are not steadily employed, for they do not know from 
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by whom,~ whereas workers like those. in the Bodinson ca~e, 
who are "regularly employed," or longshoremen on a work 
assignment that is not finished, are on someone's payroll and 
go home at night or for the week-end knowing when they are 
to return to work, for what employer, and at what job. The 
attempted distinction thus turns on the "probable expec-
tancies" (See Jersey Oity Printing 00. v. Oassidy, 63 N.J.Eq. 
759 [53 A. 230, 233]) in the two types of employment. Work-
ers like those in the Bodinson case can reasonably expect at 
the end of each day that their work will be available to them 
the following day, just as the employer can reasonably ex-
pect them to be present to perform that work. The expec-
tancy is based only on a probability, however, for each party 
may terminate the relationship at will, whether because the 
employer has no work to be performed, the employee is un-
able to perform it, or either is unwilling to continue the rela-
tionship. A registered longshoreman, however, has more than 
an expectancy; his right to work is more secure than that of 
the ordinary employee, for he has a legally enforceable right 
whereby the group is entitled to first call on the work and 
each longshoreman is entitled to his share. Although he does 
not work regularly for the same employer at the same place 
of business, a procedure forbidden by the contract between 
the longshoremen's union and the employers' association, and 
the intervals between work assignments may at times be 
longer than those for a factory worker, because of the inter-
mittent nature of longshore work, he works under an employ-
ment arrangement that assures him his proportionate share of 
the work on the San Francisco waterfront. He is not per-
mitted to look for work witn the indIvidual members' of the 
employers' association but is dispatched to the various docks 
where his services are required, in his turn in the manner 
described. Under the arrangement provided by the contract 
the longshore work of the port is his work. If there is work 
to be done the employers cannot refuse it to him. The interval 
between work assignments is a normal incident of his em-
ployment. The longshore work that each claimant regularly 
pe:r;formed for the val'ous members of the employers' associa-
tion, and to which he had an exclusive right was "his work" 
within the meaning of section 56 (a). That work cannot be 
taken from him except by joint action of his union and the 
employers' association acting through the Joint Labor Rela-
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tions Committee. It was this work that claimants left when 
they refused to perform it during the ship clerks' strike. 
[7] The commission's interpretation of "establishment" 
as each place of business of each employer, however apt it may 
be generally, does not fit the facts in the present case. The 
longshoremen's work and its locale are governed by contract. 
One of the objects of the contract was the abolition of the 
system that normally prevailed when some longshoremen 
worked regularly for one employer while others had only oc-
casional work. Under the contract all registered longshore-
men are assigned through the hiring hall to all the work of 
all the employers. As applied to these facts the term "estab-
lishment" as used in section 56(a) means the place of em-
ployment, namely, the various docks covered by the contract, 
where the longshoremen customarily work. This was the area 
covered by the ship clerks' strike. The disqualification of the 
claimants therefore continued for the period covered by th.at 
strike. [5b] That the Legislature did not intend that the 
payment or withholding of benefits should turn on nice dis-
tinctions in the definition of words like "employed" and 
"establishment" is evident from section 1 of the act: "As a 
guide to the interpretation and application of this act the 
public policy of this State is declared as follows: . . . The 
Legislature therefore declares that in its considered judgment 
the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the 
State require the enactment of this measure under the police 
power of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of funds 
to be used for a system of unemployment insurance providing 
benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of their 
own, and to reduce involuntary unemployment and the suf-
fering caused thereby to a minimum." The act establishes 
a policy of neutrality in trade disputes by provisions that 
the payment or withholding of benefits should not be used to 
aid either party to a trade dispute. Thus the provision dis-
qualifying a worker who leaves his work because of a trade 
dispute § 56 (a) is balanced by the provision that other un-
employed workers shall not be required to fill the vacated jobs 
or lose their right to unemployment insurance benefits. 
(§ 13 (b) (1).) The payment of benefits to a claimant who 
leaves his work because of a trade dispute would conflict with 
this policy just as would the withholding of payments because 
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As all the claimants in this case left their work because of 
a trade dispute, they are disqualified under section 56 (a) 
from receiving benefits for unemployment during the period 
of the dispute. 
[8] There remains for consideration the question whether 
the employees, though not entitled to an award of unemploy-
ment benefits under the act, should nevertheless receive them 
because an initial award was affirmed by the referee. Sec-
tion 67 of the act provides that "If a referee affirms an 
initial determination allowing benefits, such benefits shall be 
paid regardless of any appeal that thereafter may be taken." 
The interveners contend that under this provision they are 
entitled to receive payments from the time of the double 
affirmance, whether the award was right or wrong. The 
petitioners contend that, whatever the rights of the em-
ployees before the final determination herein, no payments 
can now be made under section 67 if it is finally decided 
that the employees are ineligible therefor. The answer to 
this question cannot be found in either the language of the 
act, or any decision to which our attention has been called; 
it must; therefore, be arrived at by a consideration of the 
legislative purpose in enacting section 67, and of the general 
law applicable to mistaken or unauthorized payment of nioney. 
It was conclusively decided in Abelleira v. District Court 
of Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d 280, 298 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715], 
that section 67 is a valid provision. The court there declared 
that the purpose of the provision was to provide prompt pay-
ments to alleviate the distress of unemployment,whatever 
the issues of law or fact that might be involved in any appeal 
from or review of the referee's decision. Under that decision, 
employees are entitled to payments immediately upon the ref-
eree's affirmance of the initial detcrmination, even though 
an appeal to the commission itself is pending, or a proceed-
ing in review, proper or improper, is pending before a court. 
The court also took occasion to indicate the necessity and 
reasonableness of such a proviSion, noting the likelihood that 
for the most part the awards will be correct, and that to per-
mit them to be withheld for months or years by appeals and 
court proceedings would defeat the objects of the statute. 
It might be concluded that the payments in the instant 
case, which should have been made upon the referee's affirm-
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ance but were not, should be made without further delay. In 
this case, however, there are two factors, not present in the 
Abelleira case: The commission itself vacated and set aside 
the decision of the referee and transferred the matter to itself 
for determination, and this court has now decided finally 
that the employees were not entitled to the payments under 
the terms of the act. 
A consideration of the first factor mU8t start with the prop-, 
osition that the commission has the power to vacate a decision 
of the referee. Section 72 provides: "Any party to a decision 
by a referee may appeal to the commission from such deci-
sion. The commission may on its own motion affirm, modify, 
or set aside any decision of a referee on the basis of the evi-
dence previously submitted in such case, or direct the taking 
of additional evidence. The commission may 'remove to itself 
or transfer to another referee the proceedings on' any claim 
pending. before a referee." This section separately provides 
that a party may appeal to the commission alid that the com-
mission may act on its own motion. There is nothing to 
indicate that the commission may not act of its own motion 
though an appeal is pending. Once it has vacated the decision 
of the referee, section 67 ceases to be applicable, for the 
vacated decision of the referee is a nullity and cannot operate 
as the second affirmance of the award. It is consonant with 
the spirit of the statute that the commission should be per-
mitted to administer the act without interference by the 
courts in its intermediate determinations. Since the commis-
sion itself acts in a supervisory capacity in reviewing the 
referee's determination, and may deliberate at some length 
in its consideration of any appeal to it; there is good reason 
to deny a stay, and to require payments to be made, pending 
decision on that appeal. There is, however, the possibility 
of a serious evil in this normal procedure, namely, that large 
groups of claimants could claim and obtain substantial sums 
in violation of the terms and objects of the statute. The act 
could not long survive if its purposes were thus distorted, 
and it is essential, in an unusual situation involving serious 
questions of law and large amounts of money, that the com-
mission step in and take over the case from the referee for 
its own consideration. The commission has the responsibility 
of administering the funds in accord with the statute, and 
to do so it must exercise reasonable supervision over its ref-
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erees. It is for the commISSIOn to determine what cases are 
of enough importance to justify a departure from the ordi-
nary procedure of appeal. It, therefore, follows that, although 
payments should start immediately upon the referee's affirm-
ance, they can be stopped at any time the commission chooses 
to exercise this extraordinary power of vacating the referee's 
decision, and can be prevented entirely if the commission acts 
immediately to vacate the decision. The commission's power 
to limit the payment of benefits must be considered in the 
light of where the alternative course would lead. If the 
interpretation and administration of the act were left to the 
referees· instead of to the commission, any referee would have 
unrestricted power to distinguish, interpret or even disre-
gard in later cases a controlling decision of the commission 
or the courts laid down as a precedent to govern future action. 
Despite any disciplinary action that might be taken against 
the referee, the commission would be powerless to stop illegal 
payments until an appeal was filed, brought to a hearing, and 
decided. 
The second factor that distinguishes this case from the 
Abelleira case is the final determination by this court that 
the awards were unauthorized. If the commission's action 
in vacating the referee's decision is disregarded, there results 
the paradox that the claimants should receive payments under 
section 67, even though they are not entitled under the act 
to any payments. The claimants contend that the silence 
of the Legislature in this regard indicates an intention that 
the payments be made, rightly or wr011gly. Under this inter-
pretation, the detailed substantive provisions of the statute 
would be subordinated to the procedural provisions of sec-
tion 67, and the award would be based, not on compliance 
with the terms of the act, but on a successful argument to a 
referee. Those who convince Referee A would be entitled to 
unemployment benefits; those who, in a similar situation, fail 
to convince Referee B would not be entitled to benefits. A 
legal right to public moneys cannot be based on such a dubi-
ous combination of an administrative officer's error and an 
obscurely worded statutory provision. The right to have pay-
ments begin upon a provisional determination of their cor-
rectness in no way establishes a right to payments once their 
impropriety is finally determined. (Of. Baldwin v. Scott 
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Oounty Milling 00., 307 U.S. 478 [59 S.Ct. 943, 83 L.Ed. 
1409] .) 
[9] In accord with the statute as interpreted in the Abel-
leira case, payments must be made pursuant to the referee's 
determination. If subsequently, however, by a decision of the 
commission on appeal or by a court on review, the payments 
are found to be unauthorized and illegal, section 67 does not 
make them valid. That section merely prevents a stay i it 
does not create a substantive right. Since the provision against 
stay does not create any rights in conflict with the substan-
tive provisions of the statute, there is no ground upon which 
the illegal awards can be paid. 
It may be added that this decision is in complete accord 
with the holding in the Abelleira case, supra, that there is no 
justification for any interference by the courts with the com-
mission's proceedings, before its final decision, and that pro-
hibition will lie to prevent it. It follows also from the decision 
herein that the proper procedure to prevent serious violation 
of the conditions governing payment of benefits is to seek the 
intervention of the commission itself to vacate the referee's 
determination. Otherwise there can be no stay of enforcement 
of the award, and mandamus may be sought to compel its 
payment. 
Let a peremptory writ issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. In my opinion the employees here 
involved were entitled to the payment of unemployment in-
surance benefits upon the affirmance of the allowance of such 
benefits to them by the referee pursuant to the provisions 
of section 67 of the California Unemployment Insurance Act. 
The holding of the majority opinion to the contrary in effect 
nullifies the provisions of section 67 of said act which were 
designed "to carry out the poLicy declared in section 1 of 
alleviating the evils of unemployment, as part of a national 
plan of social security in which federal and state legislation 
is coupled," and overrules the case of Abelleira v. District 
Oourt of Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d 280 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R. 715] 
although it purports to rely upon this case in support of its 
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the statute as interpreted in the Abelleira case, payments must 
be made pursuant to the referee's determination. If subse-
quently, however, by a decision of the commission on appeal, 
or by a court on review, the payments are found to be unau-
thorized and illegal, section 67 does not make them valid. 
That section merely prevents a stay; it does not create a 
substantive right. Since the provision against stay does not 
create any rights in conflict with the substantive provisions 
of the statute, there is no ground upon which the illegal 
awards can be paid. H 
Section 67 of the California Unemployment Insurance Act, 
after providing for a hearing and initial determination of a 
claim for benefits and an appeal therefrom reads: "If 8. 
referee affirms an initial determination allowing benefits, 
such benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which 
may thereafter be taken, but if such determination is finally 
reversed no employer's account shall be charged with bene-
fits so paid as to each such determination so reversed." 
The foregoing provision was interpreted by this court in 
the Abelleira case, and the holding in the case at bar is square-
ly contrary to the reasoning tnerein. It is said in the Abelle-
ira case at page 298: 
, , This [referring to the provision in section 67] is one of 
the most significant statements in the act. In substance it 
provides that when the initial determination has been re-
viewed and approved by the intermediate appellate authority 
(the referee), no further delay in payment shall be permitted 
even though the issues may be still further considered in a 
subsequent appeal. It was designed to carry out the policy 
declared in section 1 of alZeviating the evils of unemployment, 
as part of a national plan of social security in which federal 
and state legislation is coupled. (Sec. 2.) The very essence 
of the act is its provisio-n for the prompt payment of benefits 
to those unemployed. (See 88 Univ.Pa.L.Rev. 137, 139.) Any 
substantial d,e.la!y would defeat this purpose and would bring 
back the very eiJil sought to be avoided. The legislature, rec-
ognizing the importance on the one hand of avoiding improvi-
dent payments without due consideration of the right thereto, 
and the danger on the other hand of withholding the pay-
ments for long periods through the slow processes of appeal to 
the commission and perhaps eventually to the courts, took a 
. middle course. It provided for a preliminary appeal or 
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review of the first determination where payments were 
ordered. This appeal, ordinarily decided in a short period 
of time, carries with it a stay. But when this second deci-
sion has also been made in favor of the applicants, the benefits 
begin, with protection, as already noted, for the employer 
in the event of later reversal. . . . But in truth there 
is nothing unusual in the provision, which is in force in 
some thirty-six of the states. The legislature has concluded 
on the basis of normal experience that the large majority 
of the administrative orders will be proper, and that to per-
mit these justifiable and necessary payments to be postponed 
for long periods would defeat the objectives of the act. • . . 
"The foregoing cases demonstrate the weakness of the 
argument that because a commission may make an occa-
sional error in ordering some payment out of a public or 
semi-public fund, the courts must have the power to stay 
any and all payments during the lengthy period of judicial 
review. The legislature has concluded that it is wiser to 
have a system of unemployment compensation operating 
with a possible small percentage of error, than to have a 
system not operating at all. The legislative power to make 
such provision is unquestioned; the statutory language can-
not be misunderstood; and for the courts that is the end of 
the matter." (Italics added.) It is to be noted that great 
stress is laid upon the necessity of prompt payment and 
that the payments shall continue during appeal, otherwise 
the whole purpose of the act will be frustrated; that the Leg-
islature chose to accept the risk of annullment of the order 
for payment of benefits believing that the probabilities were 
such that the great majority of the. claims would be decided 
correctly. 
The majority opinion states that it agrees with the Abelle-
ira case, and then proceeds to hold that benefits need not be 
paid upon the affirmance of an allowance by a. referee. On 
the contrary, the Abelleira case held that the Legislature 
chose to run the risk of the few instances in which an al-
lowance of benefits, affirmed by a referee, would be found 
erroneous, and that, therefore, payment should be made upon 
such affirmance. The wording of the statute itself admits 
of but one interpretation. It states that the benefits. shall be 
paid regardless of any appeal. Certainly the appeal em· 
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braces a decision on appeal. The sole requirement is that 
the initial allowance of the claim for benefits be affirmed by 
the referee. There is no requirement that it be correct or 
found to be correct on appeal, and, as pointed out in the 
.Abelleira case, the Legislature assumed the risk of the rela-
tively few cases which would be incorrectly decided. 
The conclusion reached in the majority opinion in support 
of its position that benefits need not be paid upon the af" 
firmance of an allowance by a referee is based upon the 
obviously unsound premise that "that section (67) merely 
prevents a stay; it does not create a substantive right. Since 
the provision against stay does not create any rights in con-
:fl.ict with the substantive provisions of the statute, there is 
no ground upon which the illegal awards can be paid." No 
authority is cited for the foregoing statement and I doubt, 
if any can be found. It cannot be denied that the above, 
quoted provision of section 67 of the Unemployment Insur-
ance Act creates a right to receive benefits undei' said act 
"if a referee affirms an initial determination allowing bene-
fits. " In other words, the act provides that upon such 
affirmance, "benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal 
which may thereafter be taken." To say that such a provi-
sion does not create a substa.ntive right, is to disregard the 
clear meaning of the plain language there used. Can it be: 
said that the above quoted provision of section 67 does not 
create a right to receive benefits? The answer is obvious, 
that it does create such right. Can it be said that such right 
is not a substantive right Y The answer to this question is, 
also obvious that such right is a substantive right. This 
must be so if the Unemployment Insurance Act creates any-
thing in the nature of a substantive right in favor of those, 
unemployed. 
A substantive right is contrasted with a remedial right. 
It is said in Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed.), page 1672, 
that substantive law is: 
"That part of the law which the courts are established to 
administer, as opposed to the rules according to which the 
substantive law itself is administered. That part of the law 
which creates, defines, and regulates rights, as opposed to 
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of 
enforcing rig-hts or obtaining redress for their invasion.' ~ 
Here the act expressly and unconditionally gives a i-ight--, 
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the right to receive payment of the benefits. It is not a 
remedy, method, or rule by which a right is acquired. It is 
the right itself. No steps are required to obtain it. It is a 
granted right . 
The payment of the benefit after affirmance by the referee 
is not by the terms of the statute wholly without limitation. 
Section 67 expressly provides that the employer's accountl 
shall not be charged if the allowance of the claim is finally 
reversed on appeal. Hence, the Legislature did consi,dcr 
the question of what, if any, conditions should be imposed 
upon .or result from the payment of benefits even though an 
appeal was taken. It must be presumed that that condition 
was the sole one intended by the Legislature. If it had in-
tended others it would have so stated. Its failure to do so 
clearly evinces an intent that it did not so intend. The rule 
of statutory construction stated in In re De Neef, 42 Cal.App. 
2d 691, 694 [109 P.2d741], is applicable: 
',' Thus we are confronted with two well known rules of 
statutory construction-that when the language of a statute 
is clear and unambiguous it does not permit judicial inter-
pretation or construction; and that, when the statute itself 
specifies its exceptions, no other may be added under the 
guise of judicial construction." (Italics added.) And in 
Perkins v. Thornburgh, 10 Cal. 189, 191: 
"It will be seen that the Code itself states the effect of 
the verdict, if in favor of the claimant. It also states the 
effect of the verdict, if against the cillimant, as to costs. 
When a statute assumes to specify the effects of a certain 
provision, we must presume that all the effects intended by 
the law-maker are stated. (Lee v. Evans, 8 Cal.Rep., 424; 
Bird v. Dennison, 7 Cal.Rep. [297], 307; Melony v. Whitman, 
[People v. Whitman] page 38 of this volume.)" (Italics 
added.) (See also Duncan v. Superior Oourt, 104 Cal.App. 
218 [285 P. 732]. 
, Concerning the question of whether or not, in the instant 
'case, the employees should be entitled to the benefits which 
should have been paid but were not prior to the reversal on 
.appeal there are several persuasive arguments why the em-
'ployees should be entitled thereto. First, the purpose of the 
act, that is, to have prompt payments regardless of an ap-
peal will be thwarted if they alte not so made. The officinls 
administering the act will be wholly free at their whim or 
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caprice to defeat that purpose by merely failing to make the 
payments or by the action of the commission in setting aside 
the referee's affirmance of the initial allowance. Certainly 
the Legislature did not intend that the main, and aa expressed 
in the Abelleira case, the most important part of the act 
should rest upon such a precarious basis. Second, the bene-
fits must be paid "regardless of any appeal." That phrase 
clearly embraces the decision on appeal. Paraphrasing, it 
would read that the benefits are payable regardless of a re-
versal on appeal. In other words there was an absolute 
obligation to pay, and the Legislature chose to assume the 
risk of error by the referee. (Abelleira v. District Court of 
Appeal, su-pra.) Third, the above discussed rule of statu-
tory construction applies, namely, that the only limitation 
attached to the payment was in respect to the employer's 
account. The expression of that condition eliminates others 
and others may not be added by judicial construction. 
From what I have said in the foregoing opinion, it follows 
that the employees here involved were entitled to unemploy~ 
ment insurance benefits from the date of the affirmance of 
the award in their favor by the referee and that such bene-
fits should be paid until the final determination by this court 
that they were not entitled thereto. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied September 
13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[So F. No. 16838. In Bank. Aug. 18, 1944.J 
AMERICAN-HAWAIIAN STEAMSHIP COMPANY (n 
Corporation) et al., Petitioners, v. CALIFORNIA 
EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents; 
JAMES DUGGAR et al., Interveners and Respondents. 
[1] Unemployment Relief - Disqualification - Leaving Work Be-
cause of Trade Dispute.-Dock checkers who went on strike 
[1] See 11 Oa1.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Part), "Unemploy-
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Unemployment Relief. 
ment Reserves and Social Security." 
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against employers operating terminal facilities for transport-
ing freight by water and who refused to work for them during 
the strike left their work because of a trade dispute within 
Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a) (Stats. 1935, ch. 352; 
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 878Od), and were precluded by that 
section from receiving benefit payments for unemployment 
during the strike, although at the beginning of the strike they 
were either not working on any assignment or were working 
for employers not subject to the strike. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the C81ifornia Em-
ployment Commission to vacate an order awarding benefit 
payments and to refrain from charging petitioners' accounts 
,with such payments. Writ granted. 
Brobeck, Phlcger & Harrison and Gregory A. Harrison for 
, Petitioners. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Robert W. Kenny, Attor-
ney General, John J. Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Mau-
rice P. McCaffrey, Glenn V. Walls, Ralph R. Planteen, Charles 
P. Scully, Forrest M. Hill, Gladstein, Grossman, Margolis & 
Sawyer, Ben Margolis, William Murrish, Gladstein, Gross-
man, Sawyer & Edises, Aubrey Grossman and Richard Glad-
stein for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On November 10, 1939, the Ship Clerks' 
Union, Local 1-34 of the International Longshoremen's and 
Warehousemen's Union, called a strike effective at 6:00 p. m. 
on that day against employers who were members of the Dock-
checkers Employers' Association of 'San Francisco, because 
they could not agree upon the renewal terms of collective bar-
'gaining agreements that had expired on September 30, 1939. 
'The strike continued until January 3, 1940, when it waa termi. 
nated by agreement of the parties. The Dock-Checkers' Em-
ployers' Association, noW part of the Waterfront Employers' 
Association of San Francisco, represented its members, who 
. operate terminal facilities for freight transported by water 
to and from ports on San Francisco Bay, in their collective 
bargaining with the Ship Clerks' Union. The employment 
arrangement, similar to that for the longshoremen, was estab-
lished under a contract executed on March 30, 1937, between 
the checkers' union and the employers' association. By agree-
